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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
DONG FENG FANG, CHUN LEI FU,
MAO LIN WEI, and HONG MEl ZHOU,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HEI INVESTMENTS, LLC, HOTEL
EQUITIES DEVELOPMENT VI, LLC,
HOTEL EQUITIES GROUP, LLC,
DENNIS A. MERONEY, FREDERICK W.
CERRONE, FRIEDMAN, DEVER, &
MERLIN, LLC, and SHELDON E.
FRIEDMAN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action File No. 2015-CV-261534

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS TO LIABILITY AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to
Liability and Compensatory Damages. Having considered the briefing and oral arguments of all
parties, the Court finds as follows:
According to the records of the Georgia Secretary of State, HEI Investments, LLC
("HEI") was formed as a Georgia LLC on May 21, 2014. HEI was formed to build a Fairfield
Inn and Suites in Dalton, Georgia (the "Project").

Once constructed, the Project would be

managed by an affiliated entity, Hotel Equities Group, LLC ("HEG").

The Project was to be

built on land owned by Dalton Joint Heir Investment, LLC ("DJHI"), who would become a
Series B member of HE I. Defendant Dennis Meroney ("Meroney") was tasked with finding cash
investors on behalf of HEI who would become HEI Series A members. Defendant
Meroney was HEG's Chief Investment Officer.
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Dennis

Meroney was put in contact with Plaintiffs

through Ken Baldwin, the brother-in-law

of Defendant Frederick Cerrone.

Cerrone was the

owner, CEO, and Chairman of the Board ofHEG.
Plaintiffs

signed

Subscription

Agreements

for Series A Preferred

Units in HEI

Investments, LLC ("HEI"). The Subscription Agreement required each Plaintiff to pay $250,000
for each Unit into an IOLTA Trust Account with Friedman, Dever & Merlin, LLC ("FDM"). It

also required each Plaintiff to execute the signature page of the HEI Operating Agreement. The
subscriber would become a member of HEI for all purposes upon acceptance of the Subscription
Agreement by HEI.

The Subscription Agreement stated "no sale will occur until after the

acceptance of the undersigned's completed and executed Subscription Agreement by proper
representatives of the Company." "This Agreement shall be deemed to be accepted by [HEI]
only when it is signed by a duly authorized officer of [HEI] and returned to the undersigned."
The Subscription Agreement stated "the Units are being purchased in accordance with the terms
of the Private Placement Memorandum ("PPM") dated May 19, 2014 and the Exhibits (the
"Offering Documents")." The HEI Operating Agreement was attached as Exhibit B to the PPM.
Under the Subscription Agreement, HEI could abandon the PPM before completion of the
offering and return previously paid subscription amounts to investors.

The Subscription

Agreement itself is silent as to Plaintiffs' withdrawal rights.
FDM and Defendant Sheldon Friedman, a partner at FDM, acted as the HEI transaction
attorneys and prepared several drafts of the PPM altering various terms; the parties dispute which
PPM's terms apply. On March 7, 2014, Meroney sent Baldwin a first draft of the PPM (the
"First March PPM"). Only Fu and Fang received copies of the First March PPM. On March 21,
2014, Baldwin and Fu received a copy of a revised PPM (the "Second March PPM"). All
Plaintiffs received a copy of the Second March PPM. Both the First March PPM and the Second
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March PPM listed Hotel Equities Development

VI, LLC ("HED VI") as Manager of HE!.

Cerrone was listed as the owner of HED VI and both Cerrone and Meroney as managers of HED
VI with "exclusive control over the conduct of the business of [HEI] and all decisions which are
made by [HED VI]" as "managers of the Manager." Both PPMs contained identical escrow
terms (the "Escrow Arrangements"):
Escrow Arrangements: Checks and wires received from subscribers of Units
will be delivered to Friedman, Dever & Merlin, LLC as escrow agent (the

"Escrow Agent") and will be released by the Escrow Agent when all subscribers
for the Units have been accepted by the Manager. If the Manager elects to
terminate the Offering without admitting subscribers to the Company, or the
Manager accepts or rejects a subscription, the Escrow Agent will return the
subscriber's check to the subscriber or release it to the Company, as appropriate.
In the event a subscriber withdraws his subscription prior to the acceptance of his
Subscription Agreement, he will receive a return of his check. The deposits will
not be earning interest.
A subscriber who wishes to invest in the Company by purchasing a Unit must pay
the sum of $250,000 in full upon subscription. However fractional Units may be
accepted in the discretion of the Manager.
The Manager may reject any subscription, in whole or in part, at or before the
time it has accepted the subscription and the subscriber is admitted as a Series A
Member. The Escrow Agent will not deposit a subscriber's check until the
Manager has accepted such subscriber's Subscription Agreement. Because no
final sale of a Unit will occur until acceptance of a Subscription Agreement,
subscribers have a right to withdraw their subscription at any time prior to such
event and to have their checks returned.
Both PPMs stated that Cerrone, HEG, and HED VI "shall guarantee the obligations of [HEI]
under the Loan documents." "Loan" was defined as a loan for $8.5 million for construction of
the Project for which HED VI as Manager intended to apply. Both PPMs stated "[HEI] may
modify or amend this Memorandum or any of its Exhibits at any time." The cash distributions
from operations, sale, or refinancing of the Project differed between the two PPMs.
When Meroney emailed the Subscription Agreement to Fu and Fang on May 19, 2014,
Meroney attached a copy of the First March PPM even though the Subscription Agreement
3

clearly references "the Private Placement Memorandum dated May 19, 2014."

In his email,

Meroney stated that the attached PPM "outline[ s] the terms of the construction and operation of
the [Project] for your records." Meroney testified this was a mistake on his part-he meant to
attach the most recent May 19 PPM he had received from FDM earlier that same day but he
attached the wrong one.
During discovery, Defendants produced a PPM dated May 19, 2014 (the "May 19
PPM"). The May 19 PPM changed the manager of HEI to Hotel Equities Development III, LLC
("HED III"). The prior named manager, HED VI, was and still is a non-existent entity, but HED
III was an existing LLC as of May 19. HED III was owned by Cerrone and managed by Cerrone
and Meroney. The May 19 PPM stated that Cerrone and HEG were "expected to guarantee the
obligations of [HEI] under the Loan documents." The May 19 PPM had identical terms as to
cash distributions as the Second March PPM and the same Escrow Arrangements as the prior
two PPMs. Though the Subscription Agreements signed by Plaintiffs incorporated by reference
the terms of the May 19 PPM, Plaintiffs were never sent this particular version. None of the
Plaintiffs questioned the March date to be filled in on the PPMs they received or asked for a
PPM dated May 19.

I

Fang signed the Subscription Agreement for four Units investing $1,000,085 on May 20
and Meroney, as Manager of HEI,2 countersigned on May 21.

Fu signed her Subscription

Agreement on July 15 for a fractional unit investing $200,000, Zhou signed July 21 for one Unit
investing $250,000, and Wei signed July 25 for one Unit investing $250,000.

No one signed

I Defendants and the property owner, DlHI, exchanged additional versions of the PPM before and after the
Subscription Agreements were executed by Plaintiffs. However, the revised terms were never agreed to by anyone
and for purposes of this Motion, the different proposals for the distribution of cash generated from the Project is
irrelevant as the Project was abandoned before it started and there were no cash generated to distribute.
2 As noted above, HED III or HED VI was the Manager ofHEI not Meroney in his individual capacity, but the
signature block on the "Acceptance By HEI Investments, LLC" form does not reference HED III or HED VI.
Meroney signed as "Manager" of REI, not as manager of the Manager.
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these three Subscription Agreements on behalf of HE!.

Plaintiffs transferred funds to FDM's

IOLTA account on April 7, 2014, May 7,2014, May 8, 2014, May 27,2014,
16,2014,

June 19, 2014, and July 10,2014.

June 2, 2014, June

Plaintiffs transferred a total of$1,700,085

by FDM in escrow until all eleven subscriptions were secured.'

to be held

As required by the Subscription

Agreement, at least three Plaintiffs-Fu, Zhou, and Wei-signed a signature page for the HEI
Operating Agreement which was attached as Appendix B of the Subscription Agreement. Fang
did not sign.
Ultimately, Defendants could not find enough subscribers to qualify for and obtain the
construction

loan they originally intended to pursue, so they pursued an alternative

arrangement with a third party called Black Diamond.

funding

Black Diamond offered to extend $6

million in fmancing ifHEI sent them nearly $2 million to hold in escrow as the final draw on the
Project. On August 14,2014, Meroney sent an email to Fu and Baldwin discussing the new loan
strategy.

After Baldwin posed questions, a revised email and status report (the "Status Report")

was sent on August 18 to Fu and Baldwin to be forwarded to the other investors.
would translate the summary and send Wei, Zhou, and Fang the Status Report.

Fu said she
All Plaintiffs

received the Status Report along with Fu's summary of the Status Report in Mandarin.
The Status Report notified Plaintiffs that "Hotel Equities has been able to obtain better
financing through Black Diamond Hedge Funds than originally anticipated in the proforma
described in the [PPM]."

The loan would have a higher loan-to-value

and a lower interest rate

leading to a higher return. The Status Report continued:
After a thorough review and due diligence of Black Diamond, we have concluded
that any additional risk in dealing with a non-traditional lender is well worth the
savings and improved return.

Another investor contributed money but is not a plaintiff. Ultimately the total cash held in escrow was
$1,950,085.00 and the property to be contributed by Dill! was valued at $1,500,000.00.
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The improved rate is accomplished by the use of a compensating balance held by
the lender in the form of certificates of deposit (CD's) or government securities
(bonds) and has provided a great opportunity for us. Our Funds will be deposited
with Black Diamond and utilized as that compensating balance. They will be used
as a portion of the last construction draw as opposed to the first construction draw
The loan and project has been verbally approved at
required to provide some additional exhibits which
include an appraisal, cash-flow projections, and
comparable properties. The appraisal is being done
exhibits have been provided.

this point and we will be
were anticipated. These
comparative analysis of
at this point and the other

Should you have any questions or wish additional information, please contact me.
The Status Report was from "Dennis Meroney, Project Manager, Hotel Equities."
On August 21, FDM wired $1.95 million to Black Diamond on Meroney's instruction.
However, DJHI, the landowner, never agreed to terms to include Black Diamond as Lender for
the Project and negotiations

continued until November

25, 2014, when DJHI's attorney

forwarded Friedman information about a lawsuit pending against Black Diamond as a result of a
similar funding arrangement gone bad. Upon receiving this information about Black Diamond
Defendants attempted to get the $1.95

million back from Black Diamond.

informed of the Black Diamond problems in December of 2014.
of their money-

Plaintiffs were

Plaintiffs requested the return

Fu requested a refund on December 22, Fang requested a refund on December

23, and Zhou requested refund on December 31.

There is no formal request from Wei, but

Plaintiffs claimed at oral argument the Original Complaint filed in this case served as his
demand.4

To date, Plaintiffs have not received a refund. HEI has filed suit against Black

Diamond in federal court in New Jersey and that lawsuit is still pending.
Plaintiffs filed this suit against Defendants asserting 25 causes of action in their most
recent Amended Complaint filed August 19, 2016, including counts that were dismissed by this
Fu and Wei both asserted in their affidavits that Fu demanded a refund on Wei's behalf but this is disputed by
Defendants and there is no evidence presented to otherwise support this assertion.

4
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Court in its Order on Defendants'
Partial Summary Judgment

Motion to Dismiss dated March 7, 2016.

only seeks disposition

Complaint does not affect this prior filed Motion.

This Motion for

on eight claims and so the Amended

Plaintiffs argue summary judgment is proper

for the following claims: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Conversion and Trover, (3) Money Had and
Received, (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (5) Constructive Trust, (6) Liability of Agent for Excess
of Authority, (7) Promissory Estoppel and (8) Unjust Enrichment.

Standard of Review
Summary Judgment should be granted when the movant shows "that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw."
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). A party may do this by "showing the court the documents, affidavits,
depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a
jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiffs case." Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622,
623-24 (2010); Scarborough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 829 (1999). To avoid summary
judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code section, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(e). The Court
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morgan v. Barnes, 221
Ga. App. 653, 654 (1996). "[M]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility [ are] insufficient to
preclude summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011); see Pafford v. Biomet,
264 Ga. 540, 544 (1994) (finding mere speculation did not give rise to a genuine issue of
material fact).
Analysis

I. Breach of Contract
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A. Against BEG, BEl, BED VI, Cerrone, and Meroney

Plaintiffs assert Defendants breached the Subscription Agreement by failing to refund
their invested funds, changing the terms of the PPM related to distribution of cash from the
operation or sale of the Project, negotiating a deal with Black Diamond that would give Black
Diamond majority ownership of the Project's assets and revenues in contravention of Plaintiffs'
agreement with HE! as Series A Members, and failing to complete construction of the Project in
18 months'

To determine whether a breach of contract has occurred, the Court must first

establish the existence of a contract, the terms of that contract and the parties to that contract.
To form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance and consideration. Moreno v.
Strickland, 255 Ga. App. 850, 852 (2002). The Subscription Agreements submitted by Plaintiffs
were offers to purchase Series A Units. See Fernandez v. WebSingularity,Inc., 299 Ga. App. 11,
14 (2009) ("conduct in signing the Subscription Agreement, sending it to the Appellees, and
wiring money" was a "subscription offer" to the corporation). The Subscription Agreement
states it will not be deemed accepted by HEI until a representative of HE I signs it and returns it
to the subscriber. Generally, when the offer specifies a method through which the offer must be
accepted and that method is the performance of an act, the offer can only be accepted by
performing that act. See Carterosa, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 227 Ga. App. 246, 248-49
(1997) (finding no contract when offer to renew insurance required acceptance by writing or fax
and plaintiff and his agent failed to submit plaintiffs acceptance by fax or in writing). In this
case, no one from HEI signed Fu, Wei, or Zhou's Subscription Agreements. Meroney as the
"Manager of HEI" signed Fang's Subscription Agreement on May 21,2014, but it is unclear
from the record whether HEI returned the fully executed Subscription Agreement to Fang as
Plaintiffs also assert the Subscription Agreement was breached because DJHI never contributed the property upon
which the Project was to be built. However, DJHI was never a party to the Subscription Agreement and there is no
evidence to suggest DJHI had a duty to either Plaintiffs or HEI to agree to HEI's terms for the Project.

5

8

required. Thus, there is not sufficient evidence for the Court to find on summary judgment that
HEI accepted Plaintiffs' offers through the means expressly required under the Subscription
Agreements.
Under Georgia law, "[0 ]ne may accept an offer by doing the acts contemplated by an
offer, thus creating an enforceable contract..." Weikert v. Logue, 121 Ga. App. 171, 172 (1970).

Here, it is undisputed that HEI instructed FDM to wire Plaintiffs' funds to Black Diamond, and
by using Plaintiffs' money as its own, HEI's actions could be deemed as acceptance of Plaintiffs'
offer to purchase HEI Units. Thus, there is an argument to be made that a contract was indeed
formed through HEI's actions."

However, this is a matter of proof and a question for the

factfinder. Id.
Even assuming HEI returned Fang's executed "Acceptance By HEI Investments, LLC"
form to him as required for acceptance of the offer, the applicable terms of the Subscription
Agreement are unclear. The construction of the contract is a question of law to be decided by the
trial court. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-1. "No construction is required or even permissible when the
language employed by the parties in the contract is plain, unambiguous and capable of only one
reasonable interpretation." Dan J Sheehan Co. v. Ceramic Technics, Ltd., 269 Ga. App. 773,
777 (2004) (quoting Crooks v. Crim, 159 Ga. App. 745, 748 (1981)).

"As a matter of contract

law, incorporation by reference is generally effective to accomplish its intended purpose where
... the provision to which reference is made has a reasonably clear and ascertainable meaning."
Id. (citations omitted) (binding party to terms and conditions listed on second page of contract

6 Tellingly, Plaintiffs have alternatively argued there is not an enforceable contract by including claims that can only
be enforced in the absence of a contract. The HE Defendants have acknowledged three Subscription Agreements
were never executed, but still argue the Status Update was a modification of the agreement with Plaintiffs, thereby
implicitly acknowledging that there may have been an enforceable contract with all four Plaintiffs in place.
However, all parties seem to argue the lack of an enforceable contract when seeking insurance coverage from
Hanover and in the pending appeal as to insurance coverage disputing whether coverage is excluded under a contract
exclusion provision in the insurance coverage.
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even when it was inadvertently not provided to them because first page expressly incorporated
those terms by reference).
Defendants

argue the terms

of the May 19 PPM are incorporated

because

the

Subscription Agreement expressly incorporates "the Private Placement Memorandum dated May
19,2014."

Plaintiffs assert the terms of the First March PPM are incorporated since Plaintiffs

never received the May 19 PPM and the email message from Meroney sending them the
Subscription Agreements included the First March PPM and stated the attached PPM "outline[s]
the terms of the construction and operation of the [Project] for your records."

However, "where

the terms of a written contract are plain and unambiguous, a court must confine itself to the four
comers of the document to ascertain the parties'

intent and is not permitted to strain the

construction of a contract so as to discover an ambiguity."

Triple Eagle Associates, Inc. v. PBK,

Inc., 307 Ga. App. 17, 23 (2010). Further, terms incorporated by reference apply even if a party
did not read or receive them. See Dan J Sheehan Co., 269 Ga. App. at 777 (2004) (holding
plaintiff's lack of recollection of the receipt of the second page with terms and conditions did not
create a material question of fact in light of an incorporation by reference). Therefore, the May
19 PPM is the applicable PPM.
The question then becomes whether the terms were modified by HEI through the Status
Report. The May 19 PPM gives HEI the right to modify the PPM. HEI contends the Status
Report modified the terms of the May 19 PPM and gave Plaintiffs fair notice of a new financing
deal with Black Diamond.

HEI argues Plaintiffs' silence upon receipt of the Status Report

amounts to acquiescence to the modification. Parties may modify an agreement through mutual
consent so long as they manifest their intent to modify the agreement. Randall & Neder Lumber
Co. v. Randall, 202 Ga. App. 497,498,414

S.E.2d 718, 720 (1992). "Generally, an alteration or
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modification of a contract is a question for the jury, that is, as to whether there has been a mutual
departure from the terms thereof."

Norair Eng'g Corp. v. Porter Trucking Co., 163 Ga. App.

780, 784 (1982). Likewise, parties can mutually waive provisions in a contract through conduct,
which is also a question of fact for the jury. Vakilzadeh Enterprises, Inc. v. The Hous. Auth. of
Cty. of DeKalb, 281 Ga. App. 203, 206, 635 S.E.2d 825, 827 (2006). The issue of whether the
Status Report modified any existing agreement with Plaintiffs cannot be resolved on summary
judgment.?
B. Against FDM and Freidman
Plaintiffs argue the Escrow Arrangement within the PPM constitutes a contract between
Plaintiffs and FDM and FDM's agent, Friedman.

This Court disagrees.

First, FDM, not

Freidman, was listed in the PPMs as the escrow agent. Plaintiffs have failed to show any
evidence of a contract between Plaintiffs and Friedman. Further, there is no evidence of a
separate contract between FDM and Plaintiffs. The escrow agent is an agent for both parties and
owes fiduciary duties to parties on both sides of the transaction, but Plaintiffs have not presented
a sufficient basis to imply a contract with FDM where there is not one.

See Williams v.

Northside Realty Associates, Inc., 116 Ga. App. 253, 254 (1967) ("he is the agent of both parties
and no liability attaches from his failure to do anything not required by the express terms of the
escrow or the intention and agreement of the parties").

Finally, Plaintiffs have not shown

evidence of consideration as required to form a contract. See Moreno, 255 Ga. App. at 852.
As such, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the breach of contract
claim is DENIED.
II. Promissory Estoppel and Money Had and Received

7 Since the issue of whether the Status Report was a modification of an Agrement, the Court need not address the
ambiguous terms within the Status Report, such as "our funds."
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Promissory estoppel applies when a promise is unenforceable as a contract. A promisee
may recover under a theory of promissory estoppel because "[ a] promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee ... and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise."

O.C.G.A.

§13-3-44(a).

A claim for money had and received

"exists only where there is no actual legal contract governing the issue."

Fernandez v.

WebSingularity, 299 Ga. App. 11, 13-14 (2009).
Because the existence of a binding contract cannot be determined on summary judgment,
the Court cannot grant relief for Plaintiffs under their alternative claim for money had and
received or promissory estoppel. Further the evidence shows that several of Plaintiffs' payments
were made before the Subscription Agreements were signed by them. Thus, there is a material
dispute of fact whether promises contained in the Subscription Agreement and the incorporated
documents induced certain actions of Plaintiffs as required to prove a claim of promissory
estoppel.
As such, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the promissory estoppel
and money had and received claims is DENIED.
III. Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust
"Unjust enrichment applies when as a matter of fact there is no legal contract." Tuvim v.
United Jewish Communities, 285 Ga. 632, 635 (2009); see also Marvin Hewatt Enterprises v.
Butler Capital Corp., 328 Ga. App. 317, 323 (2014). The Court cannot grant summary judgment
on a claim for unjust enrichment when the factfinder must still resolve whether a contract existed
between the parties. See Ades v. Werther, 256 Ga. App. 8, 9-10 (2002). "A constructive trust 'is
a trust implied whenever the circumstances are such that the person holding legal title to
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property, either from fraud or otherwise, cannot enjoy the beneficial interest in the property
without violating some established principle of equity. '" Ansley v. Raczka-Long, 293 Ga. 138,

141 (2013) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-12-132).

"A 'constructive trust is a remedy created by a

court in equity to prevent unjust enrichment.'" Id. (quoting St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Meeks,
270 Ga. 136, 138(2) (1998).
As such, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the unjust enrichment and
constructive trust claims is DENIED.
IV. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
"A claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three elements: (1) the existence
of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach."
Tom Brown Contracting, Inc. v. Fishman, 289 Ga. App. 601,603 (2008). Plaintiffs argue FDM
and Friedman owed duties as escrow agent and breached those duties by releasing the funds to
Black Diamond. The Court has previously noted Freidman was not listed as the escrow agent
by any version of the PPM. Further, if the factfinder finds an enforceable contract the funds will
have rightfully been HEI's funds and a jury can find HEI's transfer of the funds to Black
Diamond on Meroney's request was not a breach of FDM's duties and was in compliance with
the agreement between Plaintiffs and FDM.
As such, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the breach of fiduciary
duty claim is DENIED.
V. Conversion and Trover
"Conversion consists of an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over personal property belonging to another, in hostility to his rights; an act of
dominion over the personal property of another inconsistent with his rights; or an unauthorized
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appropriation." Kahn v. Britt, 330 Ga. App. 377, 390 (2014), reconsideration denied (Dec. 15,

2014). The right to the funds remains a fact issue as discussed above.
As such, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the conversion and trover
claim is DENIED.
VI. Liability of Agent for Excess of Authority
An agent must act within the authority granted to him. O.C.G.A. § 10-6-21. Plaintiffs
assert they were the principals and Defendants were their agents who acted in excess of the
authority granted to them by Plaintiffs. Until the existence and terms of any agreement between
Plaintiffs and Defendants is resolved by the trier of fact, the Court cannot determine if
Defendants acted in excess of their authority.
As such, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the liability of agent for
excess of authority claim is DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this 28th day of November, 2016.

~m~~s~
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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